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SIGNAL VS. NOISE: SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR
STEIN'S THEORY OF EVIDENTIAL EFFICIENCY
Mark Spottswood
ABSTRACT
In this Essay, I examine Professor Stein's intriguing new theory of
evidential efficiency, which posits that judges should admit evidence
whenever it has a sufficiently high "signal-to-noise ratio." I explore a
slightly different definition of the concepts of "signal" and "noise" than
Stein, based upon likelihood ratio values rather than the underlying
probabilities of events, and I explain why these altered concepts may be
analytically superior. Additionally, I call into question the strength of the
connection between the signal-to-noise ratio of a piece of evidence and the
costs of admitting it at trial. Nevertheless, Stein's project is worthy of great
praise because it focuses our attention on the fact that evidentiary rules
have many costs beyond their direct contributions to outcome accuracy.
Failing to consider these costs does great harm to individual litigants, the
justice system, and society at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Evidence is an unusual field of legal study, in part because so many of
its devotees doubt, from time to time, that it should exist at all. Jeremy
Bentham, the first great scholar of proof, devoted his life to abolishing all
restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, seeking a regime of "free
proof."' Two simple intuitions explain the enduring appeal of his
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful to Alex Stein and
Murat Mungan for illuminating exchanges on this topic.
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viewpoint. First, even if some evidence is misleading, we can communicate
to one another the reasons why it is misleading, at which point it is much
harder to explain why it creates any danger of error. Second, even weak
evidence is not valueless, and given the high costs of error at trial, it seems
obvious that we should consider every possible item of information that
might help us arrive at an accurate decision. Put these two facts together,
and the appeal of a system in which the fact finder is permitted to hear all
possible relevant evidence is hard to resist. Bentham was quite successful
in his campaign to eliminate the proof restrictions that prevailed in his day,2
but since then we have replaced the rules that Bentham attacked with a new
set of rules that is equally, if not more, complex. For those who agreed with
his original arguments, it can seem hard to justify this state of affairs.
Alex Stein's new article, Inefficient Evidence, explores this tension
from a new and welcome direction. His central claim is that even if a piece
of evidence is not misleading, it may be costly, and those high costs
accumulate in the aggregate, especially in jurisdictions with high levels of
litigation.4 As a result, it may be possible to justify many proof restrictions
via cost-benefit analysis, even if they exclude evidence that provides a
modest informational benefit.5 He bravely attempts to defend a number of
controversial and complicated doctrines-most notably the modem
American hearsay rule and its exceptions-on cost-benefit grounds.6 Even
if this was all he had done, his article would be worthy of careful study.
But beyond these basic policy questions, Stein also offers us an
intriguing new theory of admissibility. He borrows the concept of the
"signal-to-noise ratio," or SNR, from the fields of communication science
and engineering, and attempts to link the concept of evidential efficiency
to a repurposed version of this formula.8 In order to do so, he has to define
what "signal" and "noise" refer to in the world of evidence, and he must
also show why high SNR evidence is efficient and why low SNR evidence
is not. Put together, this is a project of grand scope, which attempts to give
us a mathematical technique that both describes and justifies the existing
landscape of American evidence law.
1. See generally WILLIAM L. TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 3, 66-
75 (1985).
2. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
MINN. L. REV. 529, 561 (1994).
3. See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REv. 423 (2015).
4. Id. at 429-35.
5. Id. at 428-29.
6. Id. at 443-50.
7. See, e.g., JOHN R. PIERCE & A. MICHAEL NOLL, SIGNALS: THE SCIENCE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 29, 51-54 (1990).
8. See Stein, supra note 3, at 435-43.
472 [Vol. 66:3:471
Signal vs. Noise
In this response essay, I will explore three questions with respect to
Stein's theory and its implementation. In Part I, I will analyze his
conception of signal and noise. As I will explain, the way he defines and
describes these concepts is problematic, producing some troubling internal
inconsistencies. I offer, as a friendly amendment, the suggestion that we
might instead define the signal and the noise as functions of subjective
likelihood ratios, and explain the advantages of doing so. In Part II, I
explore the connection between the signal-to-noise ratio of evidence and
the costs of admitting it, and argue that the connection is less direct than
Stein has asserted. Finally, in Part III, I explain why Stein's overall project
is so important to the future of evidence theory, drawing attention to some
additional ways that costly trials undermine our shared ambitions for the
American system of justice. If we, as scholars, continue to focus on the
accuracy impacts of evidence rules without also attending carefully to their
costs, we will fail to offer policy recommendations that are worthy of
credence.
I.WHAT IS THE SIGNAL, AND WHAT IS THE NOISE?
At the outset, it is worth spending some time to make sure we
understand clearly what Stein means when he speaks of evidential "signal"
and evidential "noise." The standard usage of these terms is a way to
discuss the clarity with which a mode of communication transmits
information from one place to another.9 In that usage, the numerator of the
ratio is the average power of the "signal," meaning the message that users
intend to transmit, over a given channel of communication.10 The
denominator of the ratio is the average power of the omnipresent ambient
"noise," which is always present in any communication channel." The ratio
between these two quantities quantifies the extent to which the message can
be clearly discerned over the background noise, and is commonly
abbreviated as follows: 12
P(signal)SNR =
P(noise)
In order to adapt this formula to be useful for analyzing evidence, Stein
must redefine some of its central terms; evidence law, after all, is not
9. Id. at 424-25.
10. Id. at 425.
11. Id.
12. See PIERCE & NOLL, supra note 7, at 29.
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primarily concerned,with making sure that witnesses can be heard over the
air conditioning! To do so, Stein first identifies the concept of "signal" with
"information reliable enough to allow the fact finders to determine the
probability of [an] underlying allegation," and "noise" with "the exact
opposite," meaning information that does not allow factfinders to
accurately decide the case.13 Taken at face value, this first set of definitions
might seem to indicate that "signal" and "noise" are a set of binary (and
opposite) labels, only one of which could properly be applied to a given
piece of evidence. But he soon goes on to reframe the concepts so that each
can be assessed with regard to a particular evidence item, by reference to
the "probabilities to which a given piece of information gives rise."1 4 By
assuming that multiple probabilities flow from a given evidence item, he is
then able to equate the signal with the central tendency of those
probabilities and the noise with their variance.15 But before we go so far
down the road with him, it is worthwhile to stop and ponder what exactly
these multiple probabilities are supposed to represent as a conceptual
matter. Referring to "probabilities" without more is not very meaningful;
since a probability is a measure of our uncertainty, we must identify what
underlying fact or value we are uncertain about. So in this section, I wish to
dissect what, exactly, the concepts of signal and noise might be.
The first question, then, is this: When Stein speaks of evidence that
"gives rise to probabilities," 6 what are these probabilities of? Stein does
not explain this very clearly, so it requires a close look to be sure. At times,
he seems to suggest that they are "probabilit[ies] [of] the defendant's
guilt,"' 7 but on closer examination that cannot be right. The problem with
that interpretation is that Stein equates higher "probabilities" with a higher
"signal" in the evidence, and hence, assumes that lower probabilities equate
with lower evidential value.' 8 Nevertheless, evidence suggesting that the
probability of the defendant's guilt is very low is extremely valuable
evidence. In fact, given the frequent assumption that convictions of the
innocent are a greater injustice than failures to convict a guilty party, it
could easily be argued that evidence suggesting that the probability of guilt
is extremely low is among the highest value proof that could exist. As a
result, if we follow Stein's lead on this point, we are left with an untenable
possibility: If a signal close to 0 is meant to indicate that evidence is
13. Stein, supra note 3, at 424.
14. Id at 425.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 451.
17. Id. at 433, 456 (discussing varying probabilities of guilt as the basis for signal/noise
calculations).
18. Id. at 425-26.
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equally powerful as if it had a signal close to 1, then we face the problem
that the SNRs for the two values will be very different, despite the fact that
both items have the same evidential strength and the same amount of noise.
For example, assume that item A has a signal of 0.1 and a noise of 0.1,
while item B has a signal of 0.9 and a noise of 0.1. If the low signal is
meant to prove innocence as strongly as the high signal proves guilt, then
the SNR of A and B should be the same; but in fact Stein's formula would
give item A an SNR value of 4.5 while only giving B a value of 1. Clearly,
then, we cannot treat a high and low signal as equivalent while maintaining
the formalism of the SNR ratio.
At other times, Stein seems to be using a narrower conception, such
that the probability at issue is the likelihood, given the evidence proffered
by a party, that the party's contention about a particular historical fact is
true.' 9 For instance, when Stein discusses the relation between the SNR and
the hearsay rule, he refers not to probabilities of guilt or innocence, but
instead to probabilities of the hearsay statement being true.20 Construing
the ideas of signal and noise this way avoids the disparities that arise from
tying the probability to one party's overall success, but it creates other
problems. The problem with this conception is that it fails to connect the
concept of "signal" with the importance of the evidence to the parties'
overall case. Any useful concept of the "signal" in evidence, it seems to
me, must track not just the power of the evidence to prove some fact, but
also the materiality of that fact to the larger dispute. We should be willing
to tolerate higher costs to prove facts that are central to parties' cases, and
lower costs to prove peripheral details that are unlikely to change anyone's
mind, if we wish to strike an effective balance between the utility and the
cost of evidence. By contrast, connecting the signal with the probability
that any allegation is true means that we would be assigning the same
signal to either crucial or near-irrelevant evidence, so long as the allegation
was equally likely to be true based on the evidence proffered. So, although
the "probability of the underlying event" is a better conception of the signal
than the "probability of guilt," it still leaves something to be desired.
As a friendly amendment, we might posit instead that Stein's
"probabilities" do not measure the likelihood of any particular event or
proposition, but are instead representations of evidential "strength"-in
other words, how effective that item of evidence is in changing our minds
about the case. One common way to describe the strength of an individual
19. Id at 424 (referring to the "probability of the underlying allegation"); see also id. at 444.
20. Id 444-45.
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piece of evidence item is by examining its likelihood ratio.2 1 This ratio is
expressed as the probability of observing the evidence given the hypothesis
of guilt, on the one hand, divided by the probability of observing the
evidence given the hypothesis that the defendant is not guilty, on the other:
P (e|IG)
LR(e) = P(eING)
Multiple evidence scholars have argued that these ratios provide a
useful means of assessing evidential strength,22 and even though they do
have their limitations,23 they have the advantage of giving us a
quantification of evidential strength (unlike some competing alternatives)
which is a necessity if we are going to use them in conjunction with the
signal-to-noise formula. Furthermore, unlike the "probability of the truth of
the underlying allegation" formulation discussed above, likelihood ratios
respond to variations in both the likelihood that the underlying fact is true,
and the materiality of that fact to the dispute.2 4
But before we plug likelihood ratios into Stein's formula, we must first
transform them into a workable form. Stein's formula requires an integer
measure that ranges from 0 to 1 in both the numerator and the
denominator,25 whereas likelihood ratios quantify strength in a very
different way. First, a likelihood ratio that is equal to 1 generally indicates
that the evidence has minimal value because it is equally likely to arise
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty. 26 Second, a likelihood ratio that
21. See Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1266-68
(2013) (explaining the methodology of likelihood ratio analysis); Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests
and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 5-10 (2014) (same).
22. See Cheng, supra note 21, at 1266-68; Kaplow, supra note 21, at 5-10; see also DAVID A.
SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING 218-22 (1994); see generally
Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996).
23. For some discussion on the limits of probabilistic analysis of evidence, see generally PAUL
THAGARD, HOT THOUGHT: MECHANISMS AND APPLICATIONS OF EMOTIONAL COGNITION 141-45
(2006); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden ofProof 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
557 (2013); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of
Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007).
24. See SCHUM, supra note 22, at 220-21 (explaining that the likelihood ratio function can be
expanded to separately account for the probability that testimonial evidence is true and the subsequent
probability that the hypothesis of guilt is true given that probability); see also id at 290-365 (analyzing
the many stages involved in moving from evidence to likelihood ratios about events, and in turn from
those ratios to inferring the likelihood ratio for the ultimate hypotheses under consideration).
25. See Stein, supra note 3, at 425.
26. There are, in fact, important exceptions to this principle. For instance, there will often be
items of evidence that do not favor either side in the case, but which provide crucial context, without
which the jury could not make sense of either side's account of the events under dispute. Such evidence
476 [Vol. 66:3:471
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is much greater than I implies that evidence of guilt strongly outweighs
evidence of innocence, so that evidential strength increases as the
likelihood ratio trends towards infinity. Third, when the likelihood ratio
gets smaller than 1, the evidence grows more powerful again, but this time
it helps to prove innocence rather than guilt. We might summarize these
relations with Stein's concept of the evidential signal as follows:
"Signal" or "S" Likelihood Ratio or "LR" Linguistic Description
Evidence that implies
S 1 LR approaches o guilt with maximal
strength
Evidence that implies
S 1 LRz 0 innocence with
maximal strength
Evidence favoring an
inference of guilt
0 < S < 1 0 < LR < IEvidence favoring aninference of innocence
Equivocal evidence,
S 0 LRz 1 favoring neither
inference
Or to make things easier to visualize, the relation between Stein's
"signal" and likelihood ratios could also be expressed as a plottable
function 27 relating likelihood ratio values on the x-axis with signal values
on the y-axis:
can, and should, be admitted even though it has a likelihood ratio that is very close to 1. For further
discussion on this point, see infra Part 11.
27. The function that creates this plot is as follows:
S1- LR(E), for 0 < LR 5 1,
S(E) = 0, for LR = 1,
2tan1 '(LR(E) - 1),for LR > 1
-IT
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What this discussion implies, I think, is that Stein is wrong to tie his
conception of "signal" to the concept of probability. Instead, it seems more
workable to say that the signal of evidence is a measure of its power to
persuade, which we can derive from the likelihood ratio, but which is not,
by itself, any kind of probability. Alternatively, readers who dislike the
analytical complexity that likelihood ratios introduce might choose instead
The choice of the inverse tangent function and the applicable parameters were made in order to
approximately implement the relations that would be ideal between the likelihood ratio function and the
signal function. In particular, it is desirable that S(E) approach I as LR(E) approaches infinity, and that
the S(E) be approximately equal for each pairing, LR=I/n & LR=n, where n is a positive integer. In
other words, evidence that makes it twice as likely that the defendant is guilty should have the same
signal value as evidence making it half as likely that he is guilty. The function and the corresponding
graph do not implement the second constraint perfectly, but they get it approximately right, which
should be helpful to at least advance the discussion regarding the concept of evidential "signal." I am
grateful to Murat Mungan for a helpful discussion on these issues.
If we wished to find a quantification of evidential import and strength that would be easier to
relate to a "signal" that must vary between 0 and 1, we might alternatively employ likelihood
differences, which take the form LD(e) = P(G le) - P(NGle). Likelihood differences have the
advantage that they value confirming and disconfirming evidence on an identically weighted scale, so
that proof favoring guilt grows stronger as LD approaches positive infinity, and proof favoring
innocence grows stronger as LD approaches negative infinity. Taking the absolute value, ILD(e)|, then
gives us a measure of evidentiary signal that is lowest at 0 and increases towards infinity. This avoids
the need to specify a relation that is non-differentiable because we can then define S(e) as
approximately equal to some function such as S(e) = 2tan-1 ILD(e)|. Despite this convenience,
I prefer to express the signal as a function of likelihood ratios, given that they are used with far greater
frequency both in evidence scholarship and in other fields, and given that the difference measure has
some odd properties, such as its tendency to accord lowered weight to evidence whenever the likelihood
of its arising is generally low, even if it is highly diagnostic when it arises. Cf SCHUM, supra note 22, at
220 (briefly discussing the likelihood difference approach).
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to discard probabilities entirely and consider the signal as a simple scalar
measure of evidential "strength" or "power," without defining those terms
probabilistically.
With that working definition of signal, we can then ask the logically
subsequent question: "What is noise?" Stein describes "noisy" evidence as
that which might allow fact finders to ascribe "virtually any probability to
the defendant's guilt." 2 8 Later, in his appendix, he describes the relation
between signal and noise over a given range of "probabilities" by saying
the signal is the average of those probabilities and the noise is the standard
deviation of those probabilities, once again suggesting that an underlying
"something" is varying.2 9 Following from my earlier suggestion that signal
should be understood as a function of likelihood ratios for each evidence
item, we could go further and say that noise is a measure of likelihood ratio
variance. Or, if we were willing to tolerate the limits of Stein's suggestion
that signal is an expression of the probability that proof proves the
immediate underlying event, we might also wish to follow his lead in
referring to noise as a measure of the variance in that probability. But that
draws us a bit deeper into the rabbit hole, forcing us to answer a subsequent
question: "What kind of probabilities or likelihood ratios are we working
with here?" What we need are measures of uncertainty that vary in a
particular way, producing a pattern of potential results for the signal
function, of which the central tendency is the best measure of the "true
signal." 30 As we shall see, this will be trickier than it sounds.
Most obviously, for it to make sense to talk about likelihood ratio 31
variance, we cannot define the probabilities that make up the ratio as any
kind of objective measure of epistemic uncertainty. An epistemic
probability is a measure of the "degree of justification" we possess to
believe a particular proposition based upon the evidence before us.32 As an
28. See Stein, supra note 3, at 433.
29. See id.
30. For readers who prefer to avoid likelihood ratios, we might say instead that we are searching
for some kind of value that we can represent as a scalar between 0 and 1, that takes multiple values
across some distribution, but that retains the signal (defined as a non-probabilistic measure of evidential
strength) as its mean. Even with this amendment, it would seem that we still need to introduce some
kind of uncertainty into the mix to account for the variations within the distribution.
31. Because I think the likelihood ratio basis for the signal function is more defensible, I will
refer to it through the remainder of this discussion when trying to assess what kind of conception of
uncertainty we are trying to quantify. Readers who disagree and prefer the original formulation should
feel free to mentally substitute Stein's "probability of underlying events" formulation, because the same
concerns arise with respect to either formulation.
32. See Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference in the Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding Constraints
Under Minimal Fairness to Parties, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 247, 259 n.26 (1994); Vern R. Walker,
Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1080-90 (1996)
[hereinafter Walker, Preponderance].
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objective assessment of how much warrant we have to reach a particular
conclusion on the facts before us, an epistemic probability is not meant to
describe what any individual actually believes. It is, instead, a normative
prescription telling us how much confidence we should have, based on our
evidence, if we possessed idealized powers of analysis and
reasonableness. By design, although we might, as imperfect beings,
disagree about what the epistemically ideal likelihood ratio was for a given
item of evidence, there would, in fact, be only one true value.34 Moreover,
even if we wanted to identify our disparate estimates of epistemic
probability as "noise" and the true epistemic probability as the "signal," we
have little reason to assume that the ideal value always lies at the mean of
our flawed estimated values. Accordingly, we must search for some other
kind of probability to build our signal/noise analysis upon.
Another candidate is afrequentist conception of uncertainty, which is
the notion that most of us learned first in school, but this fares no better. To
understand frequentist notions of probability, we must first make a few
assumptions. There must be a distribution of options from which we are
drawing randomly, which is another way to say that we believe we are
equally likely to select any particular item in our defined distribution.35 As
many scholars have noted, this concept may work well as a means of
solving problems in many settings, such as the insurance or gambling
industries,36 but it is a poor fit for analyzing the large class of potential
evidence items that are not presented in explicitly statistical terms. In
theory, we could imagine, for any given item of evidence, taking a survey
of all cases that had involved a similar item of evidence, counting the
number that ended in guilty and not-guilty findings, and using those
percentages as to construct a likelihood ratio. But even if we leave aside for
a moment a problem Stein himself has noted, which is that we will rarely
get "objective frequentist data" regarding the numerous questions at issue
33. See Walker, Preponderance, supra note 32, at 1091-92 (distinguishing epistemic probability
from subjective probability).
34. Some readers might wish to object that similar evidence might acquire different epistemic
probabilities in different cases, but this should be true only due to an ambiguity in our attempt to define
what "similarity" means for the purpose of this analysis. Otherwise similar evidence might, for instance,
be accorded different weight if the witness had different levels of apparent credibility, but it seems
somewhat arbitrary to label such variance a form of noise, rather than a different level of signal for two
different types of evidence that we may distinguish between based on finer-grained reference criteria. In
other words, the only way to produce variance among epistemic probabilities for a given item of
evidence is to hold ourselves ignorant of some epistemically weighty considerations when measuring
the average probability as the signal, and then measure the variance produced by taking those extra
details into account for the purpose of labeling the evidence's noisiness.
35. See JOSEPH Y. HALPERN, REASONING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY 17-18 (2003).
36. See id. at 19.
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in litigation,n we run into insurmountable obstacles. As a basis for a signal/
noise analysis, the frequentist conception of uncertainty poses particular
problems because it is meaningless to talk about varying frequencies over
multiple individual cases. Since the frequentist likelihood ratio for a
particular kind of evidence is simply the underlying ratio of guilty and
innocent defendants3 in cases involving that evidence, there seems to be no
sensible way to conceive of variance in that value.
Nor can we salvage a frequentist conception of the signal by looking
for some other form of variance among measures of frequency. It might
seem, for a moment, as if we could look at variance among the frequencies
we observe in different groupings of cases, but this founders into
arbitrariness given the problem of reference classes. Because each case is
unique, defining "similarity" with respect to both the cases and evidence
items is a judgment call. If the evidence involves a hearsay accusation,
should we look at all hearsay accusations? Or just those involving the same
crime? Should we restrict our search even further, hunting for similar
circumstances giving rise to the statement? Moreover, do we look at all
cases in the same jurisdiction? The same country? As we ponder such
questions, we will quickly discover that there are a limitless number of
reference classes we might examine for any particular item of evidence,
and that there are plausible arguments to be made in favor of a large
number of candidate classes. 3 9 Here, we face the opposite problem that we
encountered above: we can easily conceive competing values for a
frequentist likelihood ratio by looking at different reference classes, but it
is quite hard to say what basis we would have for choosing a particular one
as the optimal "signal." And even if we try to answer that difficult question,
we have no warrant to assume that the mean probability across a broad set
of reference classes would match the one drawn from the most appropriate
reference class.
But all is not lost. If we instead base Stein's signal/noise theory on
subjective likelihood ratios, 40 it may be possible to make all his
37. See Alex Stein, Bayesioskepticism Justfied, I INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 339, 341-42
(1997).
38. Or, ifwe prefer the underlying event definition over the likelihood ratio definition, the ratio of
cases involving the fact to cases not involving the fact.
39. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 23, at 111-14.
40. The invocation of subjective likelihood ratios may bother some ratios as it seems to raise the
ghost of the endless debates about Bayesian theories of evidence. I have no wish to retread that ground
in this Response Essay, but I will note two things briefly. First, we might find subjective likelihood
ratios to be a useful analytical tool even if we think that they do not provide an accurate account of the
ways that jurors ordinarily reason. Second, for the purpose of facilitating a signal-to-noise ratio
analysis, one point on which Bayesian models have an advantage is that they offer us numerical
descriptions of the strength of individual evidence items. Competing accounts have tended to take a
more holistic approach, focusing on the strength and coherence of overall narratives rather than the
2015] Signal vs. Noise 481
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assumptions more justifiable. A subjective probability is a measure of a
particular person's degree of conviction with regard to a proposition.41 In
the case of subjective likelihood ratios, they would describe the extent to
which a particular fact finder viewed a particular evidence item as
* * 42indicating guilt or innocence. Common experience suggests that people
are often persuaded to different extents by the same item of evidence, so
we will have no problem coming up with a range of possible values for
subjective likelihood ratios, even if we confine our attention to a small pool
such as the members of a particular court or the individuals eligible for jury
service in a particular jurisdiction. Thus, it will not be awkward at all to
speak of the variance in actual persuasive power as "noise."
Moreover, unlike in the cases of epistemic or frequentist probabilities,
there seems to be some useful meaning captured when we consider the
signal to be the mean of subjective likelihood ratios over a given
population of potential fact finders. Such an estimate might be thought a
useful way of describing the persuasive force we should expect the
evidence to have in the case before we know enough details about the fact
finder to make a more focused and specific estimate. In this framing, the
"signal" becomes the average persuasive force of the evidence, as
described by the function S(E) defined above, and the "noise" becomes the
variance in S(E) judgments that we would expect potential fact finders to
make. I do not know if Stein would agree with this interpretation of his
theory, but it seems the most sensible way to explain his claims that noise
is a measure of the variance in some kind of probability and that the signal
is the mean of those varying probabilities.4 3
impact of each individual evidence item. While I tend to agree that holistic accounts capture more
accurately both the subjective experience of fact-finding and some aspects of how judges view the
practice, it is hard to use them to produce a numerical score of evidential strength. Readers who doubt,
as I do, that judges and juries can or should consider likelihood ratios as a means of analyzing non-
statistical evidence items are once again encouraged to think of the ratios as an analytical tool only,
used to help us translate the varying judgments that members of the public might have regarding
evidential strength into a distribution of values that run from 0 to l.
41. See Walker, Preponderance, supra note 32, at 1083-92 (exploring the differences between
subjective and epistemic notions of probability in the legal context).
42. See id. at 1083.
43. It is also possible that Stein intends to blend the different conceptions of probability in his
theory; perhaps noise could be thought of as the variance in subjective probability measures, while
signal could be thought of in epistemic or frequentist terms. This might help us make more sense of his
normative recommendations, but as I discuss below, it will be hard to square this approach with the
assumption that the signal is always found at the mean of the probabilities that give rise to the measure
of noise or with the assumption that lower SNR values equate to higher costs attendant to admission.
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II. THE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO AND EVIDENTIAL EFFICIENCY ARE NOT
EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS
Having spent some time exploring what, exactly, the concepts of
"signal" and "noise" might mean, let us now turn our attention to a
particularly important argumentative move that Stein makes. When a
particular item of evidence involves a low amount of signal and a high
amount of noise, Stein claims it is "inefficient" and will tend to add more
expense to fact-finding than can be justified on the basis of its
informational value. Therefore, he urges, all evidence with a low SNR
ought to be excluded.4 Courts can (and do) exclude some items of
evidence on efficiency grounds in every judicial system that I am aware of.
The equation of low SNR values with inefficiency, however, is less
obvious than Stein makes it seem.
To see why the equation of low SNR and inefficiency is doubtful, let us
examine closely one of Stein's examples. He describes a hypothetical case
in which a plaintiff is allowed to prove that he suffered severe emotional
harm by learning about a tragic accident even though he was not present at
the scene.45 Because the only evidence of such harm (by assumption) is the
plaintiffs self-serving testimony, Stein claims that there would be wide
range of possible "probabilities" that might be assigned to any given case,
with an overall signal of 0.5.46 Because a jury might find the plaintiff
credible and thus find the defendant liable, a trial must be had.47 But
because the sole item of evidence has a signal that is 0.5, the plaintiff
cannot satisfy the preponderance standard and will lose.48 If every such trial
results in defeat, many social resources will be wasted, and thus, Stein
argues, the existing rule of law prohibiting such suits from ever being
brought increases overall efficiency.
For discussion purposes, let us go along with Stein for a while in
assuming that a signal value of 0.5 requires the plaintiff to lose.50 The first
problem with this example is that the same result would still follow even if
44. See Stein, supra note 3, at 427.
45. See id at 438.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 435-39.
50. If readers are willing to go along with the characterizations of signal and noise that I offered
in Part I, it would seem that truly equivocal evidence, like the testimony of a possibly self-serving
plaintiff on a matter where cross-examination is unlikely to be revealing, should have a much lower
signal value. Such testimony has a likelihood ratio very close to 1, and correspondingly it should have a
signal value that is very close to 0. This would make it possible to say that the SNR was low even when
the noise was relatively small, which seems sensible.
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the evidence had a much higher SNR. Assume, for a moment, that the
public had learned over time to be wary, but not entirely distrustful, of self-
serving testimony, and thus the average S(E) assigned to it ranged, not
from 0 to 1, but instead from 0.45 to 0.55, with the same mean of 0.5.
Because a 0.55 probability of liability is enough to satisfy the
preponderance standard, summary judgment would still be denied,
necessitating trials in every case. Likewise, if we assume (as Stein does)
the juries would all eventually use the signal value of 0.5 as the basis for
their actual verdict, the plaintiffs would still lose each trial, thus consuming
a substantial volume of social resources. But by construction, this evidence
had a SNR ratio of 10! Clearly there is much more to the idea of evidential
efficiency than signal versus noise.
Now notice something else: the majority of the cost savings in Stein's
example arose, not from the signal-to-noise relation but from the choice to
place the signal value at 0.5. Consider, now, a world in which we are still
bad at catching self-serving plaintiffs in their lies, but in which many
people also know, based on experience, that truth-telling plaintiffs
outnumber lying plaintiffs, in a 3:2 ratio. Now, we might still expect a wide
range of judgments with respect to a particular individual, but we might
also expect the central tendency of these judgments to be closer to the
average frequency of lying, so that we see a range running from 0 to I but
with a higher overall proportion of potential fact finders finding the
evidence to be persuasive, leading to a signal of 0.6. Retaining the
assumption that the signal must be the mean of the distribution and its
variance is the noise, we might still expect to observe a noise as high as
0.8, leading to an SNR as low as 0.75. But despite this low SNR, two other
important things have changed. First, if we continue to assume that jurors
will ultimately choose their verdicts based on the signal value, all the
plaintiffs will now win instead of lose. And second, although we will be
spending more money, it will be to produce liability findings in favor of the
party who, we assume, is more likely to be in the right, given that truth-
telling plaintiffs do outnumber liars. If, in a world where the above
assumptions were true, we were to exclude this testimony on the grounds
that it had a low SNR, it would be hard to defend that decision on the
grounds of efficiency.
The above discussion shows, I think, that even if SNR and efficiency
measures are related, they are correlated rather than equivalent concepts.
But I think there are deeper problems in trying to use SNR as a measure of
efficiency, which come to light once we start to question some of the
assumptions at play in Stein's examples. For instance, Stein frequently
seems to assume that, given sufficient resources, judges and juries will
typically give evidence only as much force as the signal value would
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suggest, 1 but it is far from clear why this would be true under any
reasonable conception of what the idea of "signal" is supposed to represent.
If the signal is, as I have characterized it, a function of the average of
many subjective probability assessments, then we should not so readily
assume that it will always offer reliable predictions of judge and jury
decision-making in particular cases. This is most obvious in the case of
fact-finding performed by a single official, such as a judge during a bench
trial. Consider a judge's determination regarding the credibility of a
witness. In such a circumstance, we might think of the "noise" as the
variance among the subjective credibility judgments that differing judges in
that jurisdiction might be likely to reach, and the "signal" as the average of
those judgments. Why, though, would we expect that each judge on the
court would both know what the signal average would be and be willing to
defer to it over his own judgments regarding credibility? Certainly nothing
in the rules requires him to do so; in fact, trial judges are given great
latitude regarding their determinations of witness credibility, even when
they rely on fairly noisy indicators such as demeanor evidence. 52 If we
admit that this is a likely possibility, then the low SNR of credibility
assessments has a very different outcome. It will not increase the cost of
the proceedings by much at all, because judges will quickly default to their
own, intuitive assessments of credibility, which will take no longer than
assessing evidence that has a higher SNR. But it will, by contrast, increase
the expected outcome variance in similarly situated cases. Thus, rather than
being uniquely connected to evidential efficiency, we should expect the
SNR to also correlate with the reliability and validity of case outcomes.
Jury trials might require a different assessment, however. The more
representative the jury is of the larger population, the more likely it will be
that the average juror's judgment regarding the persuasive force of
evidence will match the average in the larger population. Since juries
nearly always make verdict decisions that line up the initial leanings of a
majority of the jurors,53 we might hope that for important items of evidence
they will ultimately find the evidence approximately as persuasive as its
signal. Here, however, we might also expect that the jury would need to
deliberate longer when there is more disagreement among its members
51. See Stein, supra note 3, at 435-39 (characterizing the process of fact-finding as one of
extracting the reliable signal from the noise at varying levels of cost).
52. See Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 827, 833-34
n.20 (2011) (collecting citations to rules that require deference to credibility judgments in a broad range
of fact-finding contexts).
53. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 182-84 (1988) (discussing both observational and experimental studies
confirming this tendency).
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regarding the value of particular, important items of evidence. In such
cases, we could expect at least a modest rise in the cost of litigation without
much variance in outcomes. Still, the facts remain that deliberation is a
comparatively inexpensive phase of the trial, requiring fewer lawyer work
hours than most other stages, and that jurors in most jurisdictions are paid a
miserable pittance in exchange for their work. As a result, most cost
savings arising from reductions in deliberation time would be modest in
scope.
One potential response to this line of thinking is to reject my earlier
assumption equating "noise" with the variance of subjective judgments of
persuasive power in a population, and "signal" with the mean of those
judgments. We might assume, conversely, that "signal" represents not the
average judgment in a population, but instead some objective indication of
evidential value. To make such a description sensible, we would need to
determine the signal based on our best available judgment as to the real
epistemic value of the evidence as evaluated by maximally competent
individual who is ideally rational and resistant to bias. In order to retain
Stein's assumption that fact finders generally accord a weight to evidence
that is in line with its signal, we must also assume that real-world fact
finders can and do reason optimally, so that in that context, the subjective
likelihood ratios match the epistemic ones. Under such assumptions, we
might be willing to conclude that noisy evidence requires more cognitive
labor from both judges and juries before they arrive at the signal tendency,
thus extending the amount of time they must spend deliberating or writing
opinions. We might also expect some rises in proof costs when advocates
were forced to respond to noisy evidence, such as when it would be
necessary to call an otherwise-unnecessary expert witness to clarify
matters. In that case, we would expect a modest increase in social cost to
arise for each item of noisy evidence introduced during a trial.
There are two problems with such an approach, however. First, recall
that we chose the subjective likelihood ratios as the source for our
definitions of signal and power precisely to make sense of Stein's
description of the relations between those two terms. If we try and derive
both the signal and the noise of evidence from epistemic probabilities, we
quickly encounter a roadblock because there is no meaningful way of
describing a distribution of objectively ideal assessments of evidential
force. To have noise we must have variance, and epistemic probabilities
will be single values, not distributions of possible values.
To get around this, we might derive the signal from epistemic
likelihood ratios, and the noise from subjective likelihood ratios, but now
we will encounter a different problem: we have no general warrant for
assuming that the average judgment of persuasive force across a population
of people will match its true epistemic value. Psychologists have
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documented countless situations in which individual judgments fail to
conform to normative rationality, leaving participants with beliefs that are
internally or logically inconsistent. 54 Such failures are not mere artifacts of
the laboratory environment. Scholars of naturalized decision-making have
similarly identified numerous scenarios in which real-world decision
makers, in high stakes situations, fail to reach the right result even though
they were experts or had information at hand that indicated that they were
making a mistake." Most chillingly, the same kind of mistakes that are
made in some classic laboratory experiments involving undergraduates can
also be seen in the retrospective analysis of trials that ended in a wrongful
conviction. 6
When we focus on these last sort of mistakes, we can see clearly the
gap that must exist between the signal as a central tendency of typical
judgments and the signal as an epistemic ideal. On subjects that come up
regularly at trial, common sense intuitions fail to align with normative
rationality. People, for instance, regularly place great trust in a confident
eyewitness, even though there is ample evidence that confidence and
accuracy are poorly correlated and even in circumstances where there is
little warrant to believe that the viewing conditions made it likely that the
eyewitness formed a clear picture of the events under dispute.57 Likewise,
people seem to persistently underestimate the possibility that an innocent
defendant would confess.58 Examples like these are important because they
show not just that people can err in either direction relative to a normative
inferential baseline, but that in some cases they will tend to err
systematically. This will not only happen when decision makers act lazily
or fail to think carefully about the subjects under discussion. Rather, as I
have argued elsewhere, some kinds of cognitive errors can become
magnified through deliberation, even when people have good intentions,
54. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 3-22 (2011); KEITH E. STANOVICH,
RATIONALITY AND THE REFLECTIVE MIND 1-28 (2011).
55. See, e.g., GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 273-75 (1999);
PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE KNOw? 128-29,
161-63 (2005).
56. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG 5-13 (2011) (tracing the causes of 250 false convictions to causes such as over-reliance on
false confessions produced by high-pressure interrogation tactics and misplaced trust in the testimony of
confident but mistaken eyewitnesses).
57. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 150-57
(2012).
58. Id at 160-62; see also Mark Spottswood, The Hidden Structure ofFact-Finding, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 131, 180-93 (2013) (discussing one chilling example in which a jury relied on a
confession to convict a defendant of the rape and murder of a child despite the fact that the defendant
was excluded by DNA forensics as the source of the semen left in the body of the victim).
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given the natural impulse to use our reason to defend, rather than attack,
our own intuitive judgments. 59
Taking these facts into account, it seems very hard to maintain the
assumptions that would be necessary to maintain the defense of the SNR-
efficiency connection I suggested above. First, the fact that we can observe
systematic mistakes in decisions by judges, juries, and other expert
decision makers should reduce our confidence that real-world fact finders
will usually accord epistemically appropriate weight even to noisy
evidence. Instead, we appear to confront an empirical question which is
hard to answer: How often, and under what conditions, will they be able to
do so? Moreover, the fact that people make these sort of mistakes even in
high-stakes scenarios should also make us cautious before assuming that a
lower SNR will generally imply higher costs in terms of cognitive and
deliberative labor needed to extract the signal from the noise. If people
make systematic mistakes, then in some subset of cases, they will expend
less effort and give the easy, noisy answer. And once again, we are
confronted with an empirical quandary rather than a syllogism: How often,
exactly, do fact finders respond to confusing or uncertain evidence with
careful analysis, rather than quick, intuitive assessments? I cannot say, and
neither, I suspect, can Stein.
To put this theoretic critique in clearer context, let us consider one of
Stein's other examples of low-SNR evidence, which he labels as "self-
asserting hearsay" testimony.60 Stein uses this term for a particular subset
of hearsay statements in which the out-of-court statement has no special
indicia of reliability and the declarant cannot be called as a witness to be
cross-examined for clarification purposes.6 1 Stein declares that these
statements can have "any probability of being true," and I must agree that it
will often be hard to assess the credibility of such statements.62 Such
statements are, undoubtedly, weak evidence with a low signal value.
Moreover, we might also agree, for the sake of discussion, that members of
the public will tend to disagree wildly over the likelihood that the
statements are true or false, making them also noisy.
Still, even conceding that the SNR ratio of such testimony is low, I am
not so sure that we should agree that admitting it is highly inefficient and
excluding it correspondingly more efficient. First, it will be the rare case in
which a directed verdict motion will be won or lost on the basis of the
59. See Spottswood, supra note 58, at 188-93 (describing the cognitive mechanisms that make it
easier, in some cases, for jurors to rationalize away problematic evidence items rather than revise
judgments of guilt that feel intuitively correct).
60. Stein, supra note 3, at 432, 444-45.
61. Seeid.at444-46.
62. Id. at 445.
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admissibility of a single piece of self-asserting hearsay. Thus, excluding
such testimony will rarely buy us the large efficiency, gains discussed in
Stein's example of the emotional harm plaintiff mentioned above. Second,
admitting such evidence will not add much cost in the form of additional
trial time in the typical case, especially when the witness who would testify
about it would be called to testify about other matters anyway. Third, the
cost of admitting such evidence does not seem to depend very much on its
degree of noisiness. Plausibly, even if people disagree over whether they
trust or distrust such evidence, no one trusts or distrusts it without
reservation to the extent that they would stake their lives on it. Rather,
ordinary common sense suggests that all such statements must be viewed
with caution. Ergo, even if the variance of opinions regarding such
evidence is greater than its probative force, it is very unlikely that a typical
jury would spend much time debating the question. Rather, they would
acknowledge, just as they would in everyday life, that such weak sources of
information are not worth trusting very much to support conviction or
exoneration. 6 3 We might say, in terms of Stein's theory, that such evidence
has a signal of 0.1 (very close to a likelihood ratio of 1, suggesting minimal
probative value) and a noise of 0.1, suggesting that, at best, jurors will
expect it to be a little bit likely to be either true or untrue, but in no event
very powerful. Thus, we get a SNR of 1, which is low, but it is also hard to
envision jurors spending much additional deliberation time on this
evidence. Adding it all up, it would seem that although the evidence is
weak and the noise is high, the costs are also minimal.
Finally, though, and most importantly, Stein neglects a different kind
of cost which is produced by the need to operate a complicated mechanism
like the modem hearsay rule. The lines between self-asserting and non-self-
asserting hearsay are not always clear, and in fact, practicing lawyers spend
great amounts of time and effort arguing for or against the exclusion of
various items of hearsay evidence.64 If, as Stein suggests,65 this is to be
justified in terms of cost savings, we must also tally up, on the other side of
the equation, all the many costs that such a complicated rule imposes.
These include the cost of training law students, year after year, how to
understand one of the most complicated legal rules ever created; the cost of
testing their knowledge on the bar examination; the time that lawyers must
spend arguing over the admissibility of hearsay items when trying to settle
cases or negotiate pre-trial orders; the additional motion practice and
63. See Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule,
72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 910-11 (1992).
64. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary, The Evolution ofthe Hearsay Rule to a Rule ofAdmission,
76 MINN. L. REv. 797, 800 (1992).
65. Stein, supra note 3, at 444-45.
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judicial work required to resolve the disputes they cannot negotiate away;
the time and expense incurred whenever judges must give, and juries must
work to follow, complicated instructions to use a particular out-of-court
statement for one purpose but not for another. Adding all these costs up, I
doubt very much that they could be outweighed by the small cost of the
extra trial time incurred when a witness repeats the occasional bit of self-
asserting hearsay or the modest additional deliberation time that might be
required before the jury decides to give that testimony little weight. All of
which is to say, even if the SNR value of an evidence item tells us
something about the costs it might impose on the system, there are surely a
number of other facts that are as much, if not more, important.
III. WHY THE TURN TOWARDS EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS IS ESSENTIAL
Readers who have come this far might doubt, frankly, my statement in
the introduction that I find this to be one of the most important evidence
papers I have read in the last few years. I have, after all, disagreed both
with the way in which Stein characterizes his signal-to-noise ratio as
applied to evidence items, as well as with his central claim that low SNR
evidence should generally be excluded because it is inefficient. Despite
those concerns, however, Stein has done something truly important with
this work, which is to encourage the rest of the evidence academy to
redirect their attention from the questions that have typically occupied our
attention towards the question of evidential efficiency.6 6 Despite my
reservations about the specific theory of efficiency that Stein has offered, I
agree wholeheartedly that evidential efficiency is a topic both important
and neglected.
Evidence scholarship all too often focuses on a standard set of
questions. Many writers, among whom I would include myself, devote
extensive attention to analyzing how particular evidence rules might either
increase or decrease the accuracy of trial outcomes in individual cases.67
Other writers focus:more on preventing particular kinds of outcome errors
(such as wrongful convictions) or on assessing the fit between current
doctrines and the sources of authority that give rise to them. 68 Finally,
another vein of scholarship attempts to assess the subtler effects that
evidence rules might have, such as by causing distress to crime victims or
influencing the incentives people have to engage in different kinds of
66. Id. at 424.
67. See Koehler, supra note 22, at 880-84.
68. See SIMON, supra note 57, at 206-22.
490 [Vol. 66:3:471
Signal vs. Noise
primary conduct.6 9 In this landscape, a systematic assessment of the
relationship between different evidentiary rules and the cost of trying cases
is, quite frankly, a breath of fresh air. I do not say this because I have any
special love of accountancy or tallying up sums. Rather, a turn to efficiency
analysis is crucial because the costs and the outcome accuracy of a
litigation system go hand-in-hand.
Stein describes one serious problem with allowing cost to go
uncontained in a large system of justice, which is the multiplicative impact
of a small amount of waste across a large volume of cases.70 We might add
to that kind of concern a second one, which is the effect that high costs may
have on the frequency with which parties take cases to trial.7' It is
commonly understood by litigation scholars that raising trial costs increases
the incentives of parties to resolve their cases via settlements and plea
bargains.72 Such behavior is no doubt rational for many parties who obtain
a net surplus by avoiding trial costs and who can split some of that surplus
between them when bargaining. But that analysis only makes sense when
we are holding the costs of trial static. If we can find ways of making trials
faster and cheaper without significantly undermining their accuracy, many
parties might then find that the costs of taking cases to trial no longer
outweigh their benefits. Indeed, such considerations no doubt help to
explain the rising popularity of arbitration among parties who find
themselves frequently in court. By making it easier to take cases to trial, we
can be assured that those cases that end in settlements and plea bargains are
more likely to be handled in that way because the parties prefer a
negotiated outcome rather than because that is the only kind of outcome
they can afford.
Moreover, when trials are hard to obtain, many other kinds of harm can
follow. Law's ability to command compliance depends on a number of
factors, including the availability and salience of public information
regarding the consequences of law-breaking, as well as the system's overall
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 73 Excessively high-settlement and
plea-bargaining rates undermine the first objective. Many civil settlement
bargains are made and kept in secret, and as a result, when the number of
settlements goes up, the number of public determinations regarding the line
69. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 768-71 (2005).
70. See Stein, supra note 3, at 433-35.
71. Cf Marc Galanter, The anishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 465, 494, 527 (2004) (tracing the decline
of civil and criminal trials in federal and state courts over time).
72. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-6 (1984).
73. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 64-68 (1990).
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between legal conduct and liable conduct falls.74 Plea bargains must be
made publicly, but nevertheless, such proceedings lack the salience and
drama of a criminal trial that ends in a verdict. Finally, both surveys and
observational studies have revealed a strong connection between
perceptions of courts' legitimacy, on the one hand, and the public's
willingness to follow the law's commands, on the other.75 The trial ritual is
the justice system's public face and the setting in which we go farthest to
demonstrate our respect for the dignity of both the victim and the accused.
As such rituals shrink from public visibility, we may find that the public's
respect and obedience to the law diminish as well. Conversely, to the extent
we can find reforms in procedure and evidence law that makes trials both
affordable and fair, we may increase not only the satisfaction of parties in
litigation, but overall compliance with, and respect for, the law.
CONCLUSION
Professor Stein's article is a welcome breath of fresh air, in that it
invites us as evidence scholars to lift our gaze from the particular and
consider the impact of admitting items of evidence at a systemic level. We
should all be grateful for this invitation, because it is all too easy to get
caught up in the complex analysis required to determine what the accuracy
effects of a piece of evidence might be within the confines of individual
cases. In such analysis, it is standard to take certain shortcuts, such as
assuming that the case will be taken to trial either way and that the parties
and the justice system will not be affected in any broader way by the
decision. We make such assumptions at our peril.
I have, in this Response, offered some focused criticisms of the specific
way that Stein implemented the ideas of "signal" and "noise" as descriptors
of evidence items and of his linkage between those metrics and the broader
idea of evidential efficiency. It should not be surprising that there is room
for improvement on these technical matters because Stein's project was
massive and he took it very far, very quickly. I make these criticisms in the
hope that he and other scholars of proof will continue to examine the cost
effectiveness of evidential rules-a course of study that may greatly enrich
our shared field of inquiry.
74. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study ofSettlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 (1991).
75. See TYLER, supra note 73, at 62-64.
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